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Can Indian Tribes Sell or Encumber Their Fee Lands Without Federal Approval? 
Mark A. Jarboe and Daniel B. Watts1 
“This Court has never determined whether the Indian 
Nonintercourse Act, which was enacted in 1834, applies to 
land that has been rendered alienable by Congress and later 
reacquired by an Indian tribe.”2 
 
I. The Issue 
 
A few years ago, an Indian tribe in the Pacific Northwest desired to purchase a 
hotel located on a parcel of land owned in fee by a non-Indian party and to finance the 
acquisition with a bank loan. The bank was willing to make the loan on terms  
acceptable to the tribe, including a requirement that the loan be secured by a mortgage 
on the hotel and site. The structuring and documentation of the loan overcame the 
normal hurdles and challenges until it hit an unforeseen obstacle: Could the tribe legally 
grant the required mortgage to the bank? 
What caused the concern was one of the oldest federal statutes still in effect: 25 
U.S.C. §177, referred to as the “Indian Nonintercourse Act” (the “INIA” or the “Act”).  
The INIA states: 
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or 
of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of 
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the 
same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant 
to the Constitution. Every person who, not being employed 
under the authority of the United States, attempts to 
negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or 
to treat with any such nation or tribe of Indians for the title or 
purchase of any lands by them held or claimed, is liable to a 
penalty of $1,000. The agent of any State who may be 
present at any treaty held with Indians under the authority of 
the United States, in the presence and with the approbation 
of the commissioner of the United States appointed to hold 
the same, may, however, propose to, and adjust with, the 
 
 
1 
Mark A. Jarboe is a graduate of the University of Michigan and Harvard Law School and a member of 
the Bar of the State of Minnesota. He recently retired as a partner in Dorsey & Whitney LLP, in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he was Chairman of the firm’s Indian Law Practice Group.  Daniel B. 
Watts is a graduate of Bard College and Seattle University School of Law. Daniel is a staff attorney in the 
Office of Legal Counsel for the Nez Perce Tribe. 
2 
Cass County, Minnesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 115 n.5 (1998). 
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Indians the compensation to be made for their claim to lands 
within such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty.3 
Although most tribal land holdings consist of trust land,4 the land at issue in this 
transaction was not. Rather, it was non-Indian owned fee land that the tribe was 
purchasing directly from a non-Indian owner.5 The question that the tribe and its lender 
faced was:  Does the INIA apply to land acquired by a tribe in fee? 
A. Confusion in the Authorities 
 
Our examination of the INIA revealed several conflicting lines of authority. 
However, while there is considerable divergence in the discussion of the scope and 
reach of the Act,6 there is surprisingly little divergence as to its scope and reach in 
practice. We have not found any case in which a final decision has applied the INIA to 
land acquired and held by a tribe in fee7 so as to prevent a sale, transfer, or 
encumbrance. Nevertheless, judicial, congressional, and  administrative  authorities 
often speak as though the Act does apply to fee lands, with those authorities both 
ignoring each other and failing to consider the context in which the INIA arose.8  This  
has resulted in confusion and uncertainty for tribes and their business partners. We 
believe that the only practical way to eliminate that uncertainty is through a 
congressional enactment settling the issue. 
B. Effects on the Tribes 
 
As a policy matter, application of the INIA to tribally owned fee lands would be 
beneficial   to   tribes   under   certain   circumstances   and   detrimental   under others. 
 
3 
The INIA was first enacted in 1790, was amended and extended in 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834. 
It was given its present form in 1875. Each of the first four enactments was in effect for three years at a 
time, thus triggering the periodic reenactments. Act of July 22, 1790, Pub. L. No. 1–33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 
138; Act of March 1, 1793, Pub. L. No. 2–19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329, 330; Act of May 19, 1796, Pub. L. No. 4– 
30, § 12, 1 Stat. 469, 472; Act of March 3, 1799, Pub. L. No. 5–46, § 12, 1 Stat. 743, 746; Act of March 
30, 1802, Pub. L. No. 7–13, § 12, 2 Stat. 139, 143; Act of June 30, 1834, Pub. L. No. 23–161, § 12, 4 
Stat. 729, 730. 
4 
See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 98 (3d ed. 2002). 
5 
Fee title to trust land is held by the United States of America in trust for the beneficial interest of the 
tribe. There are also individual trust lands held similarly for the benefit of individual Indians; those lands 
are not within the scope of this paper. Trust land cannot be encumbered or sold by the tribe without the 
approval of the federal government—the tribe doesn’t hold the fee title to trust land and, as a fundamental 
principal of property law, only the fee owner of a parcel of land can transfer or encumber it—and the INIA 
is irrelevant to trust land as a result. Trust land is also not subject to state or local property taxation 
because it is property of the United States of America. 
6 
For example, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook, the bible of federal Indian law, states on the subject: “If land 
is purchased by tribes without federal involvement … the express terms of the statute seem to apply, but 
its application is uncertain owing to a series of tax decisions.” FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW § 15.06[4] (2005) (citations omitted) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
7 
Other than in the case of the former Spanish Pueblos, as discussed below in Section IV.A. 
8 
See § IV. C, infra. 
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Restriction of tribally owned fee lands from transfer would reduce the chance of their 
removal from tribal ownership and control through involuntary means (for example, 
property taxation and execution on a judgment). However, that same restriction would 
prevent voluntary transfers and encumbrances, thereby reducing—or eliminating—a 
tribe’s ability to derive economic benefit from the land by obtaining a mortgage for the 
purpose of acquiring the land or using the land as collateral for a loan to finance the 
construction of improvements.9   A clarification of the INIA’s original purpose and a 
limitation of the Act to its original scope would, likewise, be beneficial to tribes under 
some circumstances and detrimental under others. Tribes would be unrestricted in their 
ability to transfer and encumber fee lands voluntarily but they would also be vulnerable 
to the involuntary loss of fee land. 
As discussed below, in some jurisdictions courts have held that the INIA does not 
restrict the taxation, and subsequent involuntary loss, of tribal fee land but in those 
same jurisdictions there have been no assurances that the INIA does not restrict 
voluntary transfers or encumbrances of that same land. As a result, the tribes in those 
jurisdictions suffer both detrimental interpretations of the INIA. 
C. Changes in the Nature of Tribal Land Holdings 
 
Although the core language of the INIA has changed little over the past 220 
years, the world of tribal land ownership has changed much. In 1790, almost all of the 
land that now constitutes the United States was owned and possessed by the tribes.10 
Title to nearly all of this aboriginal land has since been ceded to the United States, 
patented and resold to non-Indians.11 Reservations—areas set aside from an aboriginal 
land cession and reserved for the sole use of the ceding Indians—were established, 
 
9 
For example, while considering what eventually became Public Law 106-217, which authorized the 
Lower Sioux Community to sell or encumber its fee lands, Rep. Don Sherwood (R-PA) remarked that 
“[t]he Lower Sioux Community has found this law [the INIA] to be a major detriment to economic 
development. The law puts the tribe at a distinct disadvantage, because it finds that it cannot develop or 
use land which it has acquired to its full advantage.” CONG. REC., H521 (Feb. 29, 2000). Mr. Sherwood 
was followed by Rep. David Minge (D-MN) who stated: 
I would like to suggest to the subcommittee that it consider legislation that deals 
with this type of situation because I expect that the Lower Sioux community is not 
the only Native American group in the United States that faces this type of 
obstacle to the disposition of land that it has purchased which has not been in 
trust status which is off of its reservation area. 
CONG. REC., H521-H522 (Feb. 29, 2000). 
Some commentators have argued that even the federal restrictions on encumbrances of trust 
lands should be revisited for these same reasons. See, e.g., United States Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, Oversight Hearing on Economic Development, May 10, 2006 (testimony of Mr. Lance Morgan, 
CEO of Ho-Chunk, Inc), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Morgan051006.pdf. 
10 
Felix Cohen, Original Indian Title, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 278– 
279 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1970); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
11 
See Indian Reservations in the Continental United States (map), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/DOCUMENTS/ResMap.htm. 
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then broken up, allotted and sold, mostly to non-Indians. Some tribes are actively 
reacquiring land within their reservations or other historical areas, and other tribes are 
acquiring or reacquiring land outside of those areas. Contemporary tribal land  
ownership now includes trust and fee land both within and outside reservation 
boundaries. None of these situations were present—or even envisioned—at the time  
the INIA was enacted, but the language “[n]o purchase, grant, lease or other 
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of 
Indians” still remains. 
D. Outline of this Paper 
 
Part II of this paper provides the history and legal underpinnings of the INIA. Part 
III explores the few early interpretations of the INIA. Part IV explores 20th and 21st 
century judicial, congressional, and administrative interpretation of the INIA. Next, 
because the authors recognize that tribes and the business community will not be 
willing to rest the legitimacy of their transactions on the persuasiveness of even a well- 
written law journal article, Part V proposes the consideration of a Congressional 
enactment to confirm the original reach and scope of the INIA. Finally, Part VI offers a 
conclusion. 
II. Underlying Legal Theory of the INIA – Aboriginal Title and the Doctrine of 
Preemption 
 
“Every schoolboy is taught to believe that the lands of the 
United States were acquired by purchase or treaty from 
Britain, Spain, France, Mexico, and Russia. . . . 
Notwithstanding this prevailing mythology, the historic fact is 
that practically all of the real estate acquired by the United 
States since 1776 was purchased not from Napoleon or any 
other emperor or czar but from its original  Indian  
landowners. . . . What we did acquire from Napoleon was not 
the land, which was not his to sell, but simply the power to 
govern and tax, the same sort of power that we gained with 
the acquisition of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands a  century 
later.”12 
 
The INIA codifies one of the most important concepts of federal and tribal 
relations: the doctrine of aboriginal title, a doctrine older than the United States itself. 
This doctrine served as the foundation for both the original enactment of the INIA and its 
subsequent revisions and is implicit in the application of the Act.13   The concept of 
 
12 
Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34–35 (1947). 
13 
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 139–144 (1970). 
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aboriginal title is entwined with the European doctrine of preemption; aboriginal title 
consists of a tribe’s right to possession of its land subject to the preemptive right of the 
sovereign to acquire the land if and when the tribe decided to sell.14 
The doctrine of preemption evolved as European nations, discovering more of  
the New World, sought a theory both to explain their relationship with the native 
occupiers of the land and to prevent competing nations from intruding in their respective 
areas of interest.15 The theory, stated briefly, is that the discovering nation, by virtue of 
its discovery, obtained dominion and sovereignty over  the  land  discovered.16  The 
Indian tribes, as native occupiers of the land, continued to hold the right of possession  
to the land, but did so subject to the sovereignty of the discovering nation.17 And the 
discovering nation—the sovereign—had the exclusive right to acquire the interests of 
the tribe in the land if and when the tribe decided to part with it.18 As Chief Justice 
Marshall explained: 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the 
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely 
disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, 
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of 
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain  
possession of it, and to use it according to their own 
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as 
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their 
power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever 
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental 
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who 
made it.19 
When the United States became independent following the Revolution, the 
sovereignty over the land, and the right of preemption as to Indian lands, moved from 
 
 
 
 
14 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572–584 (1823). 
15 
PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 139–144. 
16 
Id. 
17 
See the extensive historical discussion by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572–584. One 
of the seminal decisions of federal Indian law, the case involved claims of title to aboriginal lands 
purported to be conveyed to private individuals by the chiefs of two tribes in 1773 and 1775, prior to the 
Revolution and prior to the enactment of the INIA. The Court held that the purported transfer was 
ineffective as it was in violation of the government’s right of preemption. 
18 
The right of pre-emption resided in the sovereign—the discovering nation—and not its individual 
subjects. Only the sovereign itself could acquire title from the aboriginal inhabitants. That principal was 
made clear, as to the English colonies of North America, in the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763. 
19 
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
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the English Crown to the new government.20 The first Congress  enacted  the  first 
version of the INIA in the year following the adoption of the Constitution, thus confirming 
the federal government’s position as to the successor to the Crown as holder of the right 
of preemption and its control over the acquisition of lands from the tribes as the new 
nation grew and expanded. 
The history of its enactment leaves little question that the INIA was intended only 
to apply to the original acquisition of aboriginal title from the tribes.  That is, the INIA  
was intended to protect the federal government’s preemptive right to acquire aboriginal 
title from tribes, preventing other countries, the states, or individuals from doing so. As 
we shall see, however, as tribal land holdings expanded to include trust and fee lands 
the broad language of the INIA began to be applied—at least in word—to those lands as 
well. 
III. Early Authorities 
There is little 19th century authority interpreting the INIA. The first authority 
specifically addressing the effect of the INIA on fee patented lands held by a tribe is a 
May 14, 1857 opinion of U.S. Attorney General Jeremiah Black.21 In that matter, the 
1854 treaty between the United States and the Delaware Indians, by which the 
Delaware ceded lands to the United States, contemplated the sale and patenting of 
certain of those lands to the “Christian Indians.”22 The Christian Indians had settled 
within the aboriginal territory of the Delawares and had made improvements to the lands 
they occupied.23 During the treaty making negotiations between the Delawares and the 
United States the parties contemplated a sale of the lands to the Christian Indians at 
$2.50/acre.24    The  Secretary  of  the  Interior  posed  several  questions  regarding the 
nature of the title that would be held by the Christian Indians to Attorney General Black, 
who provided the following opinion: 
[A] fter these lands shall be confirmed to the Christian Indians 
by patent they will not hold them by the usual Indian title.  
The usual Indian title was in the Delawares. It was 
extinguished by the first article of the treaty, and an absolute 
title vested in the United States. The United States will 
convey their right to the Christian Indians by the patent, and 
20 
After a period of uncertainty under the Articles of Confederation, when there was disagreement as to 
whether that sovereignty and right flowed to the national government or to the individual states as 
successors to the former colonies, see COHEN at § 15.06[1], the issue was settled in the Constitution of 
1789 which vested in the Congress the power “to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,” U.S. 
Const., art. I, § 8. 
21 
Christian Indians, 9 Op. Att’y. Gen. 24 (1857). 
22 
Id. at 2. 
23 
Id. at 2. 
24 
Id. at 2–3. 
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they will hold, like any other purchaser, from the 
Government.25 
The phrase “like any other purchaser” leaves little doubt that the  Christian 
Indians took title to the lands in fee simple. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Attorney 
General, the lands would be subject to the INIA and the Christian Indians would require 
federal approval to sell the lands freely: 
I cannot think that it [the INIA] applies merely to those Indian 
tribes who hold their lands by the original Indian title. The 
words are broad enough to include a tribe holding lands by 
patent from the United States, and the purpose of the statute 
manifestly requires it to receive that construction.26 
Twenty-eight years later, Attorney General Augustus Hill Garland was asked to 
determine whether the INIA required federal approval of surface leases of tribal trust 
land to non-Indian ranchers on three reservations in what was then the Indian 
Territory.27 Attorney General Garland took a similarly sweeping view of the applicability 
of the INIA to Indian land transactions.28  He concluded that: 
This statutory provision [the INIA] is very general and 
comprehensive. Its operation does not depend upon the 
nature or extent of the title to the land which the tribe or 
nation may hold. Whether such title be a fee simple, or a 
right of occupancy merely, is not material; in either case the 
statute applies. . . . Whatever the right or title may be, each 
of these tribes or nations is precluded, by the force and  
effect of the statute, from either alienating or leasing any part 
of its reservation, or imparting any interest or claim in or to 
the same, without the consent of the Government of the 
United States.29 
Although Attorney General Garland’s words follow the thinking of his  
predecessor, the context of his opinion involved reservation lands—lands set aside for 
the tribes by act of the United States.30 As a federal set-aside, those lands belonged to 
the United States and federal approval of their sale or encumbrance would have been 
required by virtue of that fact alone; recourse to the INIA was not necessary and the 
 
25 
Id. at 4. 
26 
Id. at 6–7. 
27 
Lease of Indian Lands for Grazing Purposes, 18 Op. Att’y. Gen. 235 (1885). 
28 Id. 29 
Id. at 4–5. 
30 
Id. at 1. 
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opinion’s language goes beyond what is necessary to reach the proper result. 
Notwithstanding that, the little authority that there is from the 19th century reads the INIA 
literally and applies it to any lands held by a tribe under any form of title. 
IV. 20th and 21st Century Authorities 
In the 20th and 21st centuries courts began to address the scope of the INIA. The 
modern cases arose in a number of different contexts due both to the varying historical 
contexts in which tribal lands were set aside and to the growing diversity of the nature of 
tribal land ownership. First came the Pueblo fee land cases, in which Pueblos in former 
Spanish territory held land nominally in fee but subject to restraints on alienation under 
Spanish law. Next we consider the cases dealing with the condemnation of lands of the 
Tuscarora Nation in New York, which are sometimes cited as standing for the 
proposition that the INIA applies to tribal fee lands but in fact do not. We then look at 
cases that state that the INIA applies to tribal fee lands and find that that conclusion is 
dicta. Finally, we look at the most recent cases which do not apply the INIA to tribal fee 
lands. 
A. Pueblo Fee Land Cases 
The analysis of 20th century cases starts with a series of decisions known as the 
Pueblo fee land cases. These cases, two from the Supreme Court and one from the 
Tenth Circuit, have been read to stand for more than what they actually hold. The 
Pueblo fee land cases addressed the status of lands held by Indian pueblos in the 
southwest United States in the area formerly held by Spain, then by Mexico after its 
independence, then acquired by the United States in 1848 under the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.31 They have often been cited for the proposition that the INIA 
applies to lands held by tribes in fee, which is superficially correct.32  However the  
nature of that fee title as it originated under Spanish law is an anomaly which the courts 
concluded to be the functional equivalent of aboriginal or trust title elsewhere in the 
country.33 The application of the INIA to those lands, once they came under the 
jurisdiction of the United States, necessarily followed in order to apply the same 
protections and restrictions to those lands as applied to aboriginal lands under United 
States law. 
The first of these cases, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), involved 
not the INIA but the application of federal statutes restricting the introduction of 
intoxicating liquor into Indian country in New Mexico.  The Court traced the nature of the 
 
31 
See infra pp. 8–10. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, formerly known as the Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, was signed on February 2, 1848 and 
proclaimed on July 4, 1848.  9 Stat. 922. 
32 Id. 33 
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39–40 (1913). 
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land holdings of the New Mexico pueblos which originated in grants from the Spanish 
Crown.34 These grants were reserves made in fee simple status but subject  to  
restraints on alienation under Spanish law and official supervision by the Crown.35 That 
status continued upon acquisition of the territory by the United States and confirmation 
of the Spanish grants by Congress.36 Therefore, although the pueblos in what was 
formerly a Spanish possession held their land in fee simple, that fee was granted to 
them by the Spanish crown under a guardian/wardship concept similar to the trust 
concept that developed in the United States (where the fee itself is held by the United 
States).37  Sandoval thus established the basic nature of pueblo fee title. 
The next case in the line is United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926). 
This case involved an action brought by the United States “to quiet in the Indian Pueblo 
of Laguna the title to certain lands alleged to belong to the pueblo in virtue of a grant 
from Spain, its recognition by Mexico and a confirmation and patent by the United 
States.”38 The Court specifically held that the INIA applied to lands held by the pueblos 
based on the guardian/ward relationship previously identified.39  The Court stated: 
Under the Spanish law Pueblo Indians, although having full 
title to their lands, were regarded as in a state of tutelage  
and could alienate their lands only under governmental 
supervision. . . . Thus it appears that Congress in imposing a 
restriction on the alienation of these lands, as we think it did, 
was but continuing a policy which prior governments had 
deemed essential to the protection of such Indians.40 
In short, under Spanish law the pueblos were unable to alienate  their  land 
without governmental consent, even though the fee title held by the pueblos, and that 
restriction carried over when the land involved became part of the United States. That 
restriction could not be applied through the concept of trust title, because fee title was 
held by the pueblos rather than the United States. The legal vehicle used to accomplish 
the result was the INIA. 
The final case of the three, Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 
1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 940 (1958) also involved a quiet title action brought by the 
United States with respect to property owned in fee by the Pueblo of Laguna. Two 
statutes were at issue in Alonzo, the INIA and Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act of 
 
34 
Id. at 39. 
35 
Id. 
36 
Id. at 40. 
37 
Id. 
38 
United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926). 
39 
Id. at 437. 
40 
Id. at 442 (citations omitted). 
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1924, which explicitly imposed a requirement of federal approval with respect to any 
conveyance of pueblo lands in New Mexico.41 
In Alonzo, different parcels of the property involved had different histories: (a) 
51,578.19 acres had been held by the Pueblo in fee since the time of Mexican 
sovereignty, (b) 4,693.36 acres consisted of land which initially had been confirmed in 
the Pueblo by the United States, but which it later lost to the holders of superior title and 
then purchased from those holders, and (c) 480 acres consisted of land adjacent to the 
land in (a) and which the Pueblo purchased in fee in the 20th century.42 The court held 
that all of the lands at issue were subject to federal restrictions on transfer, and did not 
distinguish between the lands held by the Pueblo prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, the lands within those lands lost and then acquired by the Pueblo, and the 
small tract adjacent to the Pueblo’s aboriginal lands purchased by the Pueblo.43 
However, given Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act there would likely be no difference 
in outcome. 
What is central, in reviewing Sandoval, Candelaria, and Alonzo is that they 
involve tribal fee titles held by pueblos under grants originating from the Spanish Crown 
and restricted under Spanish law. While these cases are frequently cited for the 
proposition that the INIA applies to land held by tribes in fee,44 the nature of the fee titles 
in these cases is particular to the pueblos.   Restricted fee title held by a pueblo is 
treated similarly to aboriginal title as that title is understood in those parts of the country 
that had not been under Spanish rule. The cases did not address land that was in the 
public domain, patented to non-Indians, and later purchased by a tribe.45 
B. The Tuscarora Cases 
 
Before proceeding further, we must note that a number of decisions (for example, 
Lummi  Indian  Tribe  v.  Whatcom  County46  and  Tonkawa  Tribe  of  Oklahoma  v. 
 
41 
Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 1957). Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act read: 
No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to which 
their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall hereafter be 
acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico, or in any other 
manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale, grant, lease of 
any character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claim thereto, made by any 
pueblo as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a community of Pueblo Indians, in 
the State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity in law or in equity unless the same be 
first approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 
For a discussion of the essential provisions of the Pueblo Lands Act, see Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985). 
42 
Alonzo, 249 F.2d at 438–439. 
43 
Id. at 443–444. 
44 
See the discussion at IV.C, infra. 
45 
With the possible exception of the 480 acres in Alonzo that was not separately addressed by the court. 
46 
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 
(1994). 
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Richards,47 both discussed below) refer to the Tuscarora cases48 as standing for the 
proposition that the INIA applies to tribal fee lands. That is simply incorrect. The 
Tuscarora cases involved the condemnation, for purposes of a reservoir for a 
hydroelectric project on the Niagara River, under the authority of Section 21 of the 
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 814, of land acquired by purchase by the Tuscarora 
Nation and held by the Nation in fee.49 The Nation argued that the INIA prohibited the 
condemnation.50 The courts, however, did not address whether the INIA applied to the 
property; they held, instead, that even if the INIA did so apply it would not stand in the 
way of the condemnation: 
[W]e must hold that Congress, by the broad general terms of 
§ 21 of the Federal Power Act, has authorized the Federal 
Power Commission's licensees to take lands owned by 
Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed 
for a licensed project, upon the payment of just 
compensation; that the lands in question are not subject to 
any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras . . 
.; and that 25 U. S. C. § 177 does not apply to the United 
States itself nor prohibit it, or its licensees under the Federal 
Power Act, from taking such lands in the manner provided by 
§ 21, upon the payment of just compensation.51 
In the Tuscarora cases neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court held 
that the INIA applied to the lands held by the Nation in fee. 
C. Authority that the INIA Applies to Tribal Fee Lands 
 
There have been a few courts that have held that the INIA applies to land 
acquired by a tribe and held in fee, but we have not been able to find a case where that 
conclusion has controlled the result. As such, the conclusions are dicta. A prime 
example is Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. County of Rio Arriba, 883 P.2d 136 (N.M 1994).  
This case addressed the scope of the INIA in the context of the question of whether 28 
U.S.C. 1360(b)52 deprived a state court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence of an 
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Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039, 1045 (5th Cir. 1996). 
48 
Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 257 F.2d 885 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert.denied, 358 U.S. 
841 (1958), vacated as moot sub nom., McMorran v. Tuscarora Nation of Indians, 362 U.S. 608 (1960); 
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
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Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 257 F.2d at 887. 
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Id. at 888. 
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Federal Power Commission, 363 U.S. at 123–124. 
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28 U.S.C. 1360(b) states that: “Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or 
taxation of any real or personal property . . . belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or 
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation 
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easement over fee lands acquired by the tribe.53 The tribe argued that, under the INIA, 
the fee land became subject to a federal restriction upon alienation when it  was 
acquired by the tribe and, as a result, the state court was without jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the existence of the claimed easement.54  The New Mexico Court of Appeals 
agreed with the Tribe, holding that “[u]nder federal case law . . . the [land in question] 
became subject to federal restrictions against alienation under the INIA when it was 
purchased in fee simple by the Tribe in June 1985, and was subject to these restrictions 
at the initiation of this lawsuit.”55 However, with the exception of an earlier edition of  
Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook, the authorities cited by the court consisted of the three 
Pueblo fee land cases (Candelaria, Sandoval, and Alonzo), a case involving trust lands 
(United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1938)), and a case under 
25 U.S.C. 81 which specifically reserved the question of the applicability of the INIA 
(Narragansett Indian Tribe v. RIBO, Inc., 686 F.Supp. 48 (D.R.I. 1988)).56  None of  
these authorities provided support for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion.  On review, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court, referring to the same edition of Cohen’s Handbook, stated: 
“We . . . agree that the [land in question] became subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States when it was purchased by the Tribe.”57 
However, the New Mexico Supreme Court went on to conclude that that restriction did 
not deprive it of jurisdiction to adjudicate the claimed easement and, as a result, the 
conclusion did not control the result in the case.58 
In Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039 (5th Cir. 1996), the 
court cited the 1885 opinion of Attorney General Garland,59 Alonzo, the Tuscarora 
cases, and situations of aboriginal, treaty, or trust title as authority for its conclusion that 
“[t]he Nonintercourse Act protects a tribe’s interest in land whether that interest is based 
on aboriginal right, purchase, or transfer from a state.”60 However, the court found that 
the tribe had no interest in the land in question to be protected by the Act.61 Again, the 
conclusion that the INIA applied to the land did not control the result. 
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Id. at 1047. 
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D. Authority that the INIA Does Not Apply to Tribal Fee Lands 
 
Although, as we have seen, the INIA has often been read broadly, no case has 
applied the Act to tribal fee lands62 so as to invalidate a transfer or encumbrance of 
those lands. To the contrary, there are a number of decisions holding that the Act does 
not apply to property that had been placed in the public domain, patented to non-Indians 
and then purchased by a tribe, whether within or outside the boundaries of the tribe’s 
reservation. Unlike the cases discussed in the immediately preceding section, here the 
conclusion as to the reach of the INIA did control the results. 
The lead case in this section is Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 
1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994). Lummi involved an attempt by 
Whatcom County, Washington, to impose ad valorem property taxation on land located 
within the Tribe’s reservation that had been allotted, and patented in fee to Lummi tribal 
members under the Treaty of Point Elliot of 1855, and later acquired by the Tribe.63 The 
Tribe contended that once the land was acquired by it, the INIA rendered the lands 
inalienable and protected from taxation, citing the Tuscarora cases, 7,405.3 Acres of 
Land, and the Pueblo fee land cases.64 The court rejected the argument based on the 
facts that (1) the federal government had previously removed any restraints on the 
alienation of the land in question, and (2) the government created a procedure through 
which tribes can convert their fee lands to trust.65  The Court said that: 
No court has held that Indian land approved for alienation by 
the federal government and then reacquired by a tribe again 
becomes inalienable. To the contrary, courts have said that 
once Congress removes restraints on alienation of land, the 
protections of the Nonintercourse Act no longer apply. 
Moreover, the statutory authorization for the sale of Indian 
land following proper government approval makes no 
mention of reimposing restrictions should a tribe reacquire 
the land. Rather, the broad statutory  language  suggests 
that,  once  sold,  the  land  becomes  forever  alienable. We 
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Excluding Pueblo fee lands for the reasons given above. See supra Part IV.A. 
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Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1993). The ability of a state or 
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given the Act’s reference to “purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance.” Some courts have concluded 
that the Act “applies only to voluntary conveyances by the tribes themselves and not to involuntary 
conveyances by the state for nonpayment of taxes.” See, e.g., Bay Mills Indian Community v. State, 626 
N.W.2d 169, 173 (Mich.App. 2001). 
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hold that the parcels of land approved for alienation by the 
federal government and then reacquired by the Tribe did not 
then become inalienable by operation of the Nonintercourse 
Act.66 
A similar result, also in the context of taxation, was reached in Saginaw 
Chippewa Tribe v. State of Michigan, 882 F.Supp. 659 (E.D. Mich. 1995), rev’d on other 
grounds 106 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub. nom. 
Michigan v. United States, 524 U.S. 923 (1998).67 The court reached the same 
conclusion as the Ninth Circuit and held that the INIA did not apply to land that had 
been patented and later acquired by a tribe: 
 
[I]f all land held by Indian tribes were automatically restricted 
by operation of the Nonintercourse Act, then the Tribe would 
not have to submit to the cumbersome and lengthy process 
the United States referred to in oral argument and in its  
briefs whereby Tribes may petition the Department of the 
Interior to place lands owned by them into trust. If return to 
trust status were automatic via the Nonintercourse Act, a 
petitioning process to return land to trust status would be 
superfluous.68 
The same conclusion was reached, not in the taxation context, in Anderson & 
Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1996). That  
case involved an action to quiet title to 80 acres of land within the Quinault reservation 
that had been patented in 1958 and in which the Quinault Nation subsequently acquired 
a one-sixth undivided interest in fee.69   The court relied upon Lummi and Saginaw 
Chippewa in reaching its conclusion that the INIA does not apply to land as to which the 
United States had removed restraints on alienation by patent and which was then 
reacquired by a tribe.70 
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These three decisions—Lummi, Saginaw Chippewa, and Anderson & 
Middleton—have been followed by other decisions in which courts have had little 
difficulty dismissing claims of the application of the INIA to tribal fee lands when those 
lands had been patented, owned by non-Indian parties, and then acquired by a tribe.71 
E. Congressional and Administrative Interpretations 
 
While some cases have generated confusion because of their failure to analyze 
the application of the INIA in its proper historical context, that confusion has been 
compounded by actions in the Congressional and Administrative areas. A number of 
tribes seeking to sell or encumber their tribal fee lands, including the Navajo Nation,72 
the Rumsey Indian Rancheria,73 the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,74 the  
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,75 the Lower Sioux Indian Community,76 the 
Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana,77 and the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community78 
have sought and obtained Congressional authorization to do so through legislation. The 
legislative history of these acts generally makes little reference to the court decisions  
but simply refers to the plain wording of the INIA. A typical example is found in the 
legislative history of the Lower Sioux act as it was being considered in the House of 
Representatives, where Mr. Sherwood (R-PA), in speaking in favor, said that: 
[e]xisting Federal law enacted in 1834 provides that an 
Indian tribe may not lease, sell, or otherwise convey land 
which it has acquired unless conveyance is approved by 
Congress. This antiquated law applies even though the land 
was purchased by the tribe with its own money, and even 
though the land is located outside the tribe’s reservation, and 
even though the land has never been taken into trust for the 
tribe.79 
Sometimes this conclusion makes it into the legislation itself. For  example, 
among the findings in the legislation authorizing the Rumsey Indian Rancheria to sell a 
tribally-owned fee parcel located 125 miles away from the tribe’s trust lands is the 
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following statement: “Section 2116 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. 177) prohibits the 
conveyance of any lands owned by Indian tribes without the consent of Congress.”80 
Administratively, the regulations of the Department of the Interior addressing the 
sale, exchange, or conveyance of tribal lands provide: 
Lands held in trust by the United States for an Indian tribe, 
lands owned by a tribe with Federal restrictions against 
alienation and any other land owned by an Indian tribe may 
only be conveyed where specific statutory authority exists 
and then only with the approval of the Secretary unless the 
Act of Congress authorizing sale provides that approval is 
unnecessary.81 
Thus, the recent Congressional and Administrative authority, to the 
extent that it exists, supports the proposition that the INIA applies to tribal 
fee lands but does so without analysis and without addressing the 
numerous court decisions holding otherwise. 
V. Proposed Legislative Solution 
We have found two lines of authority, which do not refer to each other. The 19th 
century Attorney General opinions, the legislative history, occasional Congressional 
findings, and the Department of the Interior regulations lead to the conclusion that the 
INIA applies to tribal fee lands just as it does to any other tribal lands, but none of those 
authorities refer to the judicial decisions. Conversely, recent cases in both federal and 
state courts hold that, once land has been patented and placed in the public domain,  
the acquisition of that land by a tribe does not render it subject to the Act, but none of 
those cases refer to the Congressional findings or the legislative history of the various 
acts authorizing the sale or encumbrance of tribal fee lands, nor do they discuss the 
Attorney General opinions or the Interior Department regulations. There are also recent 
cases that support a broader application of the Act, but those cases did not lead to an 
invalidation of any transfer (and even those cases did not discuss the Congressional or 
Administrative authorities).  The result is confusion. 
If we go back to the reason for the enactment of the INIA in the first instance—to 
confirm the doctrine of preemption in United States law following the Revolution and to 
protect tribal landholdings from the grasping hands of ambitious states and settlers— 
there appears to be little justification in applying the Act to land patented, placed in the 
public domain, and then acquired in fee by a tribe.  As to that land—land not part of a 
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tribe’s aboriginal or trust holdings—a tribe should be able to buy, sell, mortgage, and 
otherwise deal with it as would any other landowner. The present, conflicting authorities 
impair the tribes’ ability to deal with their fee land as other landowners, regardless of 
whether the land in question is within or outside the tribe’s reservation boundaries. 
In order to resolve the uncertainties over a tribe’s ability to sell or encumber its 
fee lands, the authors propose the consideration by Congress of a statute of general 
application similar to those that have been enacted on a case-by-case basis for 
individual tribes. In doing so, we are mindful of the different considerations that must be 
given to lands acquired in fee by a tribe within its reservation boundaries (often as part 
of  a  program  of  land  restoration)  and  lands  acquired  elsewhere.82     While  the 
considerations of a tribe’s ability to use financing in order to acquire land initially, and its 
ability to derive economic value from such land after acquisition, apply to lands located 
within a reservation as well as lands located elsewhere, the risk of a possible repeat  
loss of reacquired reservation lands might lead tribal leaders to prefer not to have any 
confirmation of conveyance authority apply to on-reservation fee lands.83 
We propose the following language, with square brackets indicating options to be 
considered in the context of the on-reservation/off-reservation issue noted above: 
APPROVAL OF TRANSACTIONS BY INDIAN TRIBES 
WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN LANDS 
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, without further approval, ratification, or authorization by 
the United States, any Indian tribe may lease, sell, convey, 
warrant, or otherwise transfer all or any part of such tribe’s 
interest in any real property that is-- 
(1) [not located within the exterior boundaries of the 
reservation of such tribe; 
(2)] not held in trust by the United States for the 
benefit of the tribe; and 
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For example, in discussing the application of the INIA to tribal fee lands, the Solicitor of the Department 
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[(2)][(3)] not real property owned in fee by an Indian 
Pueblo on July 4, 1848[, continuously owned by such Indian 
Pueblo since that date,] and located within the area formerly 
part of the Republic of Mexico and made part of the United 
States of America under the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, 
Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico. 
(b) [Trust][Certain] Land Not Affected.--Nothing in this 
section is intended or shall be construed to-- 
(1) authorize any Indian tribe to lease, sell, convey, 
warrant, or otherwise transfer all or any part of an interest in 
any real property that is [located within the exterior 
boundaries of the reservation of the tribe or] held in trust by 
the United States for the benefit of the tribe; or 
(2) affect the operation of any law governing leasing, 
selling, conveying, warranting, or otherwise transferring any 
interest in such [trust] land. 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In the hotel acquisition transaction described at the beginning of this article, 
neither the tribe’s nor the bank’s attorneys could conclude with confidence that the tribe 
could grant a mortgage on the fee land that it planned to acquire. The parties were able 
to solve the problem with the cooperation of the seller of the hotel by placing the 
encumbrance on the land prior to its acquisition by the tribe. In a series of preplanned 
steps, the seller granted a mortgage on the parcel to the bank in order to secure the 
tribe’s obligations to the bank under the loan documents; the tribe then used the 
proceeds of the loan to acquire the land and hotel from the seller subject to the existing 
mortgage; the tribe then assumed the obligations of the mortgagor under the mortgage 
instrument; and the bank then released the seller from liability under the mortgage. At 
the end of the series of transactions the tribe owned the land and hotel in fee, subject to 
a mortgage that was in place at the time of acquisition. Through this process, there was 
no “purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance” of any interest in the site by the tribe; 
the encumbrance was already existing when the tribe took title. 
This procedure worked in that particular transaction because the tribe did not 
start out with any interest in the land and the three parties—tribe, bank, and seller— 
were willing to work together to solve the problem. In particular, the cooperation of the 
seller (who had to start the chain of events by placing a mortgage on his land prior to 
being paid for it) was essential. Not all real estate transactions involving tribal fee lands 
will take place in such favorable environs.   In order to address the problem, and to 
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enable tribes to enter into desirable commercial real estate transactions without 
hindrance from an unclear law, the authors recommend consideration of the proposed 
legislative solution described above. 
